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YUGOSLAVIA-INDIA DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS IN THE 1950s***

Abstract

The origins of Yugoslav–Indian relations may be traced to the very inception of India's independence. Although diplomatic relations were officially established on December 5, 1948, India did not accredit an ambassador to Yugoslavia until 1954. During the years 1950 and 1951, Yugoslavia, India, and Ecuador held non-permanent seats on the United Nations Security Council, and throughout this period, Yugoslavia and India consistently adopted aligned positions on a broad spectrum of international political matters, thereby laying a firm foundation for the subsequent deepening of their bilateral political engagement. The Non-Aligned Policy in Yugoslavia emerged due to the lack of cooperation with Western countries, but also due to the 1948 Cominform Resolution, which marked the breakdown of relations with the Soviet Union and other Eastern Bloc countries. In establishing the principles that Yugoslavia applied when defining its foreign policy strategy, significant influence came from the theoretical

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concepts and practices of the Indian independence movement, the oldest anti-colonial movement in the world. Tito's visit to India and Burma in late 1954 and early 1955 was of great importance for strengthening cooperation, further emphasized by the fact that Tito was the first head of a European state to visit India after it gained independence. Following Broz's visit to India and Burma in late 1954 and early 1955, economic cooperation between the two countries intensified. In July 1956, Nehru visited Yugoslavia once again, and during their meeting on the Brijuni Islands, Tito, Egyptian President Nasser, and Nehru adopted the Brijuni Declaration. However, the first international event that put Yugoslav-Indian relations to the test was the Hungarian Revolution of 1956.

Keywords: Yugoslavia, India, Josip Broz Tito, Jawaharlal Nehru, non-aligned policy, Non-Aligned Movement, active neutrality, peaceful coexistence, Security Council, United Nations

INTRODUCTION

The Indian Independence Act was proclaimed on August 15, 1947. Its adoption was preceded by negotiations with the Indian National Congress, led by Jawaharlal Nehru, who would later become the country's first Prime Minister. As a result, British India was partitioned into two independent states: India and Pakistan.

Relations between Yugoslavia and India can be traced back to India's independence. Diplomatic ties between the two countries were established on December 5, 1948 (Bogetić 2006, 156). However, while Yugoslavia promptly sent an ambassador to India following the establishment of diplomatic relations, the Indian government did not appoint its representative, citing a lack of suitable personnel and insufficient financial resources. As a result, it was not until 1952 that the Indian ambassador in Rome presented his credentials, thereby also serving as the ambassador to Yugoslavia on a non-residential basis.

However, two years later, India appointed an ambassador to Yugoslavia. During the presentation of credentials, the Indian ambassador stated in his welcoming speech that "our methods are uniquely distinct in economic, social, and political aspects, which makes them valuable on a global scale" (Crnobrnja 2016, 58).

The primary reason for the six-year absence of a diplomatic representative in Yugoslavia appears to have stemmed from the conflict between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, because the Indian leadership sought to maintain strong political ties with the Soviets while also ensuring that the economic assistance received from the “first socialist country” remained unaffected. However, following the death of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin, relations between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia began to improve, so this shift in their bilateral relations also contributed to strengthening ties between Yugoslavia and India. According to Bogetić, “The year 1954 truly marked a significant turning point in Yugoslav-Indian relations” (Bogetić 2006, 157).

JOINT ACTION IN THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

At the plenary session of the United Nations General Assembly held on October 20, 1949, Yugoslavia, India, and Ecuador were elected as non-permanent members of the UN Security Council in the second round of voting, securing a two-thirds majority with 39 votes, their term lasted from January 1, 1950, to December 31, 1951 (Jovanović 1990, 42–43). As non-permanent members of the Security Council, Yugoslavia and India adopted shared positions on a wide range of international political issues; this cooperative approach within the United Nations laid the foundation for further strengthening their political relations. According to Jovanović, “During this early period of preparations for the Non-Aligned Movement, the FPRY had its first and most significant alignment with India” (Jovanović 1985, 50).

During this period, international tensions escalated, with the most significant conflict being the Korean War. The war saw the involvement of the United States on the side of the Republic of Korea and the People’s Republic of China supporting North Korea. However, without aligning with either side, Yugoslavia, India, and Egypt formed a “compact minority”, adopting a shared “perspective on key political issues, including the Korean conflict. Their stance was more moderate than that of the United States and was considered more objective in addressing the interests of both parties in the conflict” (Jovanović 1985, 127).

Regarding the Palestinian issue, Yugoslavia, India, and Iran advocated for the “Federal State Plan” as a framework for determining Palestine’s legal and political status (Jovanović 1985, 114). The alignment of Yugoslavia’s and India’s foreign policy positions was also evident when Yugoslavia supported the Indian delegation’s proposal to recognize the People’s Republic of China as the legitimate representative of the Chinese people within the United Nations (Jovanović 1985, 195–196).

THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS AND THE BEGINNING OF THE NON-ALIGNED POLICY

The policy of non-alignment in Yugoslavia emerged due to the country’s lack of cooperation with Western nations, which stemmed from its initial alignment with the Eastern Bloc in the period immediately following World War II. However, after the 1948 Cominform Resolution, relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union – and, by extension, other socialist countries – deteriorated, prompting Yugoslavia to pursue a non-aligned course. According to Bogetić, “the origins of this doctrine and foreign policy orientation can be traced to Yugoslavia’s complex international position during the transition between the 1950s and 1960s. At that time, due to its non-bloc stance, Yugoslavia found itself in conflict with both the East and the West. For the first time, officials in both Moscow and Washington reached a rare consensus. Namely, both sides equated Tito’s foreign policy strategy with neutrality, frequently labeling it as ‘Yugoslav neutrality.’ Both viewed this policy as ‘immoral,’ ‘opportunistic,’ ‘short-sighted,’ and even as ‘a type of new social disease’” (Bogetić 2013, 33).

Yugoslavia’s foreign policy orientation was not directed toward either the Eastern or Western Bloc. According to Bogetić, “rejected by both East and West, by America and Europe, Yugoslavia once again found itself searching for a new foreign policy strategy and a way out of this complex and dangerous situation” (Bogetić 2013, 34). With no viable prospects for cooperation with either bloc, Yugoslavia had no choice but to establish relations with African and Asian countries. Since none of these nations individually represented a significant political, economic, or military force, only through stronger cooperation with many Asian and African countries could a credible political grouping emerge on the international stage. However, for the newly independent states of Asia and Africa, such an alliance needed not to form a unified third bloc in international relations,

which would become institutionalized and directly opposed to the existing military-political alliances.

The principles that Yugoslavia applied in shaping its foreign policy strategy were significantly influenced by the theoretical concepts and practices of India's independence movement, the world's oldest anti-colonial movement. As early as 1920, the Indian National Congress formulated a Foreign Policy Resolution, which was later amended in 1939 (Bogetić, 2006, 44). Bogetić states, "the foundation of India's foreign policy was not merely based on abstract principles and ideals. Its core was shaped by the philosophy and culture of the ancient civilization to which the country belonged" (Bogetić 2006, 44). The final version of this foreign policy resolution was adopted in December 1948 during the Congress Party session in Jaipur (Bogetić 2006, 44).

When examining the perspectives on international politics and foreign policy issues adopted by the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia and India, it is essential to consider the theoretical principles underpinning their actions. One of the first individuals to advocate for cooperation with Asian and African countries was Josip Đerđa. According to Dedijer, "In 1951, after returning from India, he stated during a session of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Collegium that the best way to break Yugoslavia's isolation was to build alliances with newly independent former colonial states, particularly with India" (Dedijer 1984, 554).

On February 18, 1952, during a speech at the Second Party Conference of the Guards Division, Yugoslav President Josip Broz Tito first introduced the concept of "active neutrality" and outlined its principles: 1) combating all forms of aggressive war and spheres of influence politics; 2) opposing all forms of interference in the internal affairs of individual countries and preventing progressive liberation movements from being turned into instruments of great powers; 3) maintaining good neighborly relations; 4) promoting comprehensive peaceful economic, political, and cultural cooperation, as well as democratic international relations based on equality and understanding (Jovanović 1985, 52).

According to Gudac and Đorđević, "the first example of the application of the principle of coexistence is the agreement concluded between China and India in 1954, which addresses the issue of Tibet" (Gudac i Đorđević 2000, 140). The concept of active neutrality encompasses four of the five principles of peaceful coexistence outlined in the aforementioned agreement between the People's Republic of China and India, known as Panch Sheel. This agreement expressed the commitment

of both states to respect territorial integrity and sovereignty, the principle of non-intervention, non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, and the achievement of equality and mutual benefit. Although the term peaceful coexistence is not explicitly mentioned when listing the principles of active neutrality, Yugoslavia embraced its essence by committing to non-alignment with either of the two opposing military-political blocs and establishing cooperation on equal terms with all countries, regardless of their socio-political systems and economic relations (Jovanović 1985, 52).

According to Gudac and Đorđević, “this policy is anti-bloc, as blocs divide nations and states. Coexistence enables cooperation among peoples, with each country required to respect the integrity, sovereignty, independence, social system, and equality of other nations” (Gudac i Đorđević 2000, 140). On December 18, 1962, the United Nations General Assembly proposed the codification of the fundamental principles of coexistence, which were later adopted in a special declaration in 1970 (Gudac i Đorđević 2000, 140).

According to Dedijer, “at the end of 1954, Tito, along with Ranković and Koča Popović, visited India and Burma. This trip was of great historical significance” (Dedijer 1984, 554). The importance of establishing cooperation with Yugoslavia is underscored by the fact that Josip Broz Tito was the first head of a European state invited to visit India after the Asian nation gained independence. It marked the first visit by a European leader to India, which did not have a colonial connotation. Regarding Broz’s visit to India and Burma, Dragan Bogetić states: “Tito’s visit to India and Burma in late 1954 and early 1955, countries that already had a developed and politically articulated doctrine of coexistence, represented a turning point for the final definition of the new Yugoslav strategy and for the subsequent formulation of a broad platform for the institutionalization of multilateral action by non-aligned states within the Non-Aligned Movement” (Bogetić 2006, 43). A similar viewpoint is shared by Jovan Čavoški, who emphasizes: “Moreover, this was a historical moment when socialist Yugoslavia finally ceased to be an aligned country, as it had previously been within the Soviet Bloc, or a semi-aligned country in its close cooperation with the US and NATO in the early 1950s, by then, it had become an authentically non-aligned country, fully committed to a non-bloc policy and prioritizing cooperation with all, as it was popular to say at the time, non-aligned nations worldwide, especially those in Asia, and later in Africa” (Čavoški 2023, 217–218).

In this context, the speech of Yugoslav President Tito in the Indian Parliament on December 21, 1954, drew special attention. Highlighting the similarities between the foreign policy principles of Yugoslavia and India, Broz spoke about the principle of peaceful coexistence, the bloc division of the world, and the importance of non-alignment with either of the two blocs in international relations, but he also expressed the need for coordinated action in the foreign policy of Yugoslavia and the newly independent countries of Asia and Africa. According to his perspective, there are “four fundamental negative elements that are the causes of all the ills that humanity fears and worries about today, which appear not only unnecessary but also absurd to all progressive people. These are: first, inequality among states and nations; second, interference in the internal affairs of others, often perpetrated by the largest and most developed countries; third, the division of the world into spheres of interest and blocs; and fourth, colonialism. Until these four elements are eliminated from practice in international relations, humanity will not be free from fear for its fate” (Bogetić 2006, 44).

During his visit to India, the President of Yugoslavia was ceremoniously welcomed in all the places he visited (New Delhi, Shimla, Lucknow, Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, Mysore), where mass gatherings were organized. However, Broz’s aspiration to establish closer relations based on the principles of peaceful coexistence encountered a cautious attitude from his Indian hosts, who believed it was more natural for their country to connect with other nations on the Asian continent rather than to pursue stronger political, economic, military, and cultural cooperation with distant European countries.

While newly independent states did not look favorably upon establishing ties with Western countries, particularly former colonial powers, there was no reservation about forming significant economic, political, and military relations with the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China. Additionally, India refused to confront major world powers unless Indian national interests were directly threatened. Therefore, Yugoslavia faced the challenge of bringing new Asian and African countries closer to the principles of peaceful coexistence, which did not involve aligning with either of the two existing political, military, and economic blocs.

On the other hand, Tito explained to Nehru the reasons for the establishment, nature of the alliance, and his country’s involvement in the Balkan Pact, which it had established with Greece and Turkey. Since

Greece and Turkey were members of NATO, it was necessary to clarify Yugoslavia's stance toward the Western military alliance. During his visit to Brioni, when meeting with Vijaya Lakshmi Pandit, the Chairperson of the United Nations General Assembly and Nehru's sister, who extended a personal invitation to the Yugoslav president to visit India, Broz spoke about the Balkan Pact, "justifying it by Yugoslavia's security interests and the urgent need to stabilize the situation in the region" (Čavoški 2023, 226). Thus, Tito's explanation emphasized that the character of this alliance was defensive rather than aggressive.

However, it should be emphasized that neither India nor Yugoslavia strictly adhered to the policy of non-alignment with either of the two opposing military-political blocs. While Yugoslavia moved closer to the West after the Informbiro Resolution in 1948, India engaged in intensive political and economic cooperation with the USSR (Bogetić 2006, 158).

In October 1954, diplomatic relations were established between Yugoslavia and China, which contributed to improving the reputation of the Yugoslav state in Asian countries that Broz intended to visit. Tito's visit to India and Burma, which followed closely, promoted the non-aligned stance of states emerging from the decolonization processes in Africa and Asia, while also highlighting the potential for the development of a wide range of economic, financial, trade, political, military, and cultural forms of cooperation. Western powers viewed the Yugoslav president's visit to India and Burma in light of the improving relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, which distanced newly established states from Western countries and weakened their political, economic, and cultural ties with former colonizers. The distancing of Asian and African countries from former colonial powers implied a weakening of the defense capabilities of the military alliance of Western states, NATO. Thus, neither of the two opposing blocs looked favorably upon the policy of non-alignment. According to Bogetić, "the logic of blocs did not allow for a positive treatment of non-aligned policies, but at least conditions were created for its recognition as a respectable international option" (Bogetić 2006, 52).

As the non-aligned policy did not embody a neutral stance of a group of states with a regional character,¹ Indonesian President Sukarno

¹ It is undeniable that there were regional influences on the Non-Aligned Movement. According to Damian, "When considering the regional influences on the policy and movement of non-alignment, especially those manifested through regional institutions, the connections are referred to not only from the perspective of the genesis of these two phenomena in contemporary international relations but also

advocated for a non-aligned policy that implied a universal and active approach to abstaining from any military, political, or economic bloc. According to Štrbac, "In the universalism of international solidarity and within the framework of the UN-established international legitimacy, the peoples of numerous countries saw the most secure foundation and guarantee of their independence, as well as the opportunity for equal participation in international affairs" (Štrbac 1988, 103). In this context, Bogdan Crnobrnja, then Secretary-General to President Josip Broz, spoke about Tito's understanding of the idea of universality and non-alignment during the 1961 Belgrade Conference: "Starting from the premise that non-engagement is neither a tactic nor a temporary condition, but rather an objective necessity of the modern world, our position at the conference was shaped accordingly. Nations should not be classified as good or evil (black and white). Non-engagement should not be viewed as merely a regional movement. Efforts must be made to ensure its most universal character, with special attention given to strengthening cooperation among non-aligned countries. Supporters of a non-bloc policy exist everywhere. We should not reject them; on the contrary, we must do everything possible to increase their numbers. Our work should facilitate newly independent states in adopting a non-bloc policy more easily. We must assist them in this endeavor" (Crnobrnja 2016, 86).

COOPERATION BETWEEN YUGOSLAVIA AND INDIA AFTER 1954

After Tito visited India in 1954, Nehru visited Yugoslavia the following year. At the end of this visit, a joint declaration was signed in Brioni on June 6, in which both sides agreed that they were already guided by the same principles in international politics, and Yugoslavia and India continued to align their views on significant issues in foreign policy relations, which was particularly evident through their actions within the United Nations.

In July 1956, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru visited Yugoslavia again and held meetings in Brioni with Yugoslav President

within the realm of their common interests and goals (which may be identical, only partially overlapping, or coinciding), additionally, the connections in the development of their political platforms, as well as in the area of their specific activities, are examined" (Damian, 1988, 215).

Josip Broz Tito and Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, where they discussed the most important issues of international politics. As a result of these discussions, a joint document known as the Brioni Declaration was adopted. According to Bogetić, “In domestic and foreign literature, this meeting is marked as a historical turning point and a key event within the initiatives of non-aligned states for the creation of the non-aligned movement. It is noted that this was the first meeting of the three future leaders of the non-aligned movement, at which the first multilateral document of the non-aligned was adopted” (Bogetić 2006, 159).

However, the first international event that tested Yugoslav-Indian relations was the situation in Hungary in 1956, known as the Hungarian Revolution, which lasted from October 23 to November 10 of that year and was brutally suppressed by Soviet military forces. According to Tripković, “although Tito and Yugoslavia were not directly accused, Soviet leaders believed that part of the ‘guilt’ for the political developments in these countries lay with the ‘Yugoslav example.’ It was assessed that the attitude towards Tito and the Yugoslav party needed to be ‘set in the right place,’ so in addition to the message conveyed at the meeting with representatives of the socialist bloc countries, the Presidium of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union sent a secret letter to party members in early July regarding the talks between delegations from the USSR and the People’s Republic of Yugoslavia. The letter stated that there were still many ideological differences between the two parties, stemming from the delusions of the Yugoslav communists and the economic dependence of Yugoslavia on the West” (Tripković 2013, 34). The events in Hungary thus further strained relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, which also influenced India’s cautious stance regarding the events in Hungary and Yugoslav perspectives on the Hungarian Revolution, fearing that deviating from neutral positions could worsen their relations with the USSR.

According to Tripković, “In the summer of 1956, the ideological differences between Belgrade and Moscow became increasingly pronounced and visible, as well as the dissatisfaction of the Soviet side due to the failure to bind Tito more closely to the socialist bloc and to neutralize the Yugoslav example in the eyes of the countries of the socialist camp” (Tripković 2013, 36). Therefore, the deterioration of relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union was followed by great interest not only in India but also in other countries in Asia and Africa, which also paid special attention to the newly developed circumstances

between the two socialist states. To avoid various interpretations that were already emerging in the public of those countries, President Tito visited seven Asian and African countries from December 1958 to March 1959, which did not belong to either of the two blocs – Indonesia, Burma, Ceylon, Sudan, India, Ethiopia, and Egypt. In all these countries, he discussed three groups of issues with the heads of state or governments: on the internal matters of the host countries; on current international issues; and on the improvement of bilateral relations (Bogetić 2006, 314).

Broz spent six days in India from January 13 to 18, 1959. During this period, he spent two days in New Delhi and had two discussions with Nehru. During these discussions, Nehru posed a series of questions to Tito on international politics, to which the Yugoslav president patiently responded. Both sides agreed that China was pursuing a hegemonic policy, which would lead to a deterioration of relations with the Soviet Union; however, they did not share agreement regarding Nasser's aspirations for unification with Iraq, which the Indian president viewed as a potential source of regional instability. There were also disagreements regarding the so-called Berlin crisis, as India did not share Yugoslav views in support of the Soviets, who had issued an ultimatum to the Western allies to transfer access routes to West Berlin to East Germany if they did not declare Berlin a "free city" within six months (Bogetić 2006, 322–324).

It is noticeable that Nehru exhibited restraint during Broz's visit concerning issues that could lead to regional conflicts. The Yugoslav president also had informal contacts with Indian leaders during his visits to other Indian cities, such as Hyderabad, Madurai, and Madras.

ESTABLISHMENT OF ECONOMIC COOPERATION BETWEEN YUGOSLAVIA AND INDIA

Following Tito's visit to India and Burma at the end of 1954 and the beginning of 1955, economic cooperation intensified. Access to Asian and African markets allowed Yugoslavia to sell industrial products that would have faced challenges in the more competitive Western markets. Additionally, trade through clearing arrangements helped reduce the country's foreign currency outflow.

The first agreement between India and Yugoslavia was signed on December 29, 1948, but there were significant difficulties in its

implementation. A new trade agreement was signed four years later, on July 24, 1953. However, a turning point in the development of trade relations between India and Yugoslavia occurred in 1956, when exports to India increased by as much as 15 times, rising from \$254,000 to \$3,875,593, while imports from India more than doubled, rising from \$384,000 to \$898,000 (Bogetić 2006, 162). While Yugoslavia exported steel, industrial rails, steel sheets, electrolytic zinc, and aluminum rods to India, over 90 percent of the imports from India to Yugoslavia consisted of iron ore (Bogetić 2006, 163). Direct shipping was also established between Yugoslav and Indian ports, and on March 31, 1956, a new trade agreement was signed, which was set to remain in effect until 1960 (Bogetić 2006, 162).

However, two significant problems existed in the trade relations between Yugoslavia and India. The first issue was the substantial imbalance between exports and imports, as Yugoslav imports from India covered only one-fifth of the exports from Yugoslavia to this Asian country. The second problem was related to the structure of exports. Although the export of finished machinery and electrical products, for which the Yugoslav economy could not find buyers in the Western market, increased 15 times in 1957, it still remained relatively small. Overall, Yugoslav exports to India grew by 11 percent that year, amounting to \$4,306,556 (Bogetić 2006, 163–164). Processed industrial products accounted for 85 percent of Yugoslav exports to India, while 96 percent of Indian exports to Yugoslavia consisted of iron and manganese ores (Bogetić 2006, 164).

However, due to the significant imbalance between Yugoslav exports to India and imports from India to Yugoslavia, the Indian side could no longer pay for goods in British pounds. This was communicated to the Yugoslav economic delegation that visited India in September 1957. Starting in early 1958, the Indian side began to pay for items imported from Yugoslavia in rupees, as a result, it was necessary to establish a balanced trade system by reducing the export of those products from Yugoslavia to India that could be sold abroad for dollars, while simultaneously increasing the number of products imported from India to Yugoslavia, which included coffee, tea, sugar, spices, and leather.

Nevertheless, despite the significant increase in trade cooperation with non-aligned countries, Yugoslavia's most important trading partners remained European states and the United States. Throughout the existence of the Non-Aligned Movement, the share of European

countries and the USA accounted for 78 percent, while the participation of developing countries was only 20 percent (Bogetić 2013, 37). On the other hand, in 1962, developing countries exported as much as 71.5 percent of their total exports to developed states, 22% went to other developing countries, and only 4.4 percent was exported to Eastern European countries (Stanovnik 1988, 313).

CONCLUSION

The cooperation between Yugoslavia and India emerged in the period following the end of World War II, when both countries found themselves in a specific international position. While Yugoslavia belonged to the Eastern, communist bloc after the war, the Cominform Resolution of June 28, 1948, separated socialist Yugoslavia from the “first socialist country,” the Soviet Union, resulting in the cessation of all economic, political, and military relations with both the Soviets and other socialist states.

Since India had just entered international relations, striving to avoid alignment with either the military-political bloc centered around the United States and NATO or the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, it was not in its interest to confront either side. In contrast, Yugoslavia, having exited the Soviet Bloc, formed the Balkan Pact in 1953 together with Greece and Turkey, both members of the NATO alliance. Due to Greece and Turkey’s membership in this Western military alliance, Tito explained to Nehru that the nature of this pact was defensive, rather than a military force aimed at conquering other countries.

The significance of the cooperation between Yugoslavia and India in the 1950s stemmed from the fact that Yugoslavia was the only European country pursuing a policy of non-alignment, while India had the largest population among the states that later founded the Non-Aligned Movement.

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ОДНОС ЈУГОСЛАВИЈЕ И ИНДИЈЕ ПЕДЕСЕТИХ ГОДИНА XX ВЕКА***

Резиме

Југославија и Индија су успоставили дипломатске односе након стицања индијске независности. Дипломатски односи између две државе успостављени су 5. децембра 1948. године, али је Индија тек 1954. године у Југославију послала амбасадора. Југославија, Индија и Еквадор су током 1950. и 1951. године биле несталне чланице Савета безбедности Уједињених нација и у том периоду Југославија и Индија су заузимале заједничке ставове по читавом низу питања међународне политике, што је представљао основу за даље проширивање политичких односа. Политика несврстаности у Југославији настала је као последица одсуства сарадње са западним земљама, али и због Резолуције Информбироа од 1948. године која је значила прекид сарадње са Совјетским Савезом и другим земљама Источног блока. У успостављању начела која је Југославија примењивала приликом дефинисања стратегије своје спољне политике значајну улогу су имали теоријски концепти и праксе индијског покрета за стицање независности, као најстаријег антиколонијалног покрета на свету. Титова посета Индији и Бурми крајем 1954. и почетком 1955. година била је од великог значаја за јачање сарадње, а о њеном значају говори и чињеница да је Тито био први шеф неке европске државе, који је посетио Индију након што је стекла независност. Након Брозове посете Индији и Бурми,

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с краја 1954. и почетка 1955. године, интензивира се и економска сарадња две земље. Нехру је јула 1956. године поново посетио Југославију и на Брионима су Тито, египатски председник Насер и Нехру усвојили Брионску декларацију. Међутим, први међународни догађај који је ставио на пробу југословенско-индијске односе је Мађарска револуција из 1956. године.

Кључне речи: Југославија, Индија, Јосип Броз Тито, Цавахарлал Нехру, политика несврстаности, Покрет несврстаних, активна неутралност, мирољубива коегзистенција, Савет безбедности, Уједињене нације

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