Political Review

TOWARDS THE OVERCOMING OF ISLAMISM AND POPULISM: FROM INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS TO INTERRELIGIOUS DIALOGUE

Miloš Vulić — Thu, 11 Dec 2025 22:40:11 +0100

This study aims to critically examine the thesis of the “clash of civilizations” and to explore whether such a clash is inevitable when the Eastern-Muslim and Western-Christian worlds meet, as well as whether the mutual fear between them is justified and how it is generated and mobilized. In the introductory section, we will provide an overview of the historical relations between these “two worlds” to identify the factors that opened the possibility for the emergence of radical attitudes stemming from concepts such as Islamism and Populism. After that, we will address the question of which factors contributed to their sudden “revival”, with particular focus on one of the most frequently cited causes: the refugee crisis. We will examine how this crisis emerged and the nature of the reactions it provoked, specifically the politicization of otherness. In the subsequent analysis, special attention will be given to Western Populism and its Islamophobic policies. Finally, we will explore the concepts of constitutional patriotism, Euro-Islam, and human (universal) brotherhood as potential pathways toward overcoming the negative dichotomy inherent in the notions of Islam and the West, particularly in the context of the role of interreligious dialogue in international relations and its contribution to the depoliticization of otherness.

CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY IN CENTRAL ASIA AND THE BALKANS: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE

Dragan Trailović — Fri, 12 Dec 2025 13:14:24 +0100

The paper analyses the foreign policy activities of the People’s Republic of China in Central Asia and the Balkans, highlighting the similarities and differences in its engagement in these geopolitically significant regions. The study adopts a comparative approach at the regional level, examining Central Asia and the Balkans as two parallel arenas of Chinese foreign policy activity. The comparative framework is structured around four dimensions: economic, political, security, and social.

A comparative analysis of China’s foreign policy engagement in Central Asia and the Balkans reveals how Beijing positions itself as a global actor with a flexible and pragmatic approach that relies on economic instruments as the foundation of its influence while adapting to regional specificities. In both regions, economic engagement constitutes the dominant pillar of China’s foreign policy, primarily through the Belt and Road Initiative. Similarities are also evident in the diplomatic sphere, where China combines bilateral relations with multilateral formats, emphasizing the principles of sovereignty, mutual benefit, and non-interference in internal affairs, consistent with the concept of a “community with a shared future for mankind”. Social and cultural dimensions, such as Confucius Institutes, scholarships, and media cooperation, serve as instruments of soft power in both regions.

However, despite these similarities, there are significant differences that illustrate the adaptability of China’s strategy. In Central Asia, as a neighbouring region of vital strategic importance, China demonstrates a deeper and more multidimensional engagement. This engagement is reflected in China’s economic dominance, developed trade networks, and substantial investments; politically, it relies on well-established institutional frameworks such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the China+C5 format; and in the security sphere, it is actively involved in counterterrorism efforts through security cooperation, joint exercises, and arms sales. This approach reflects the priorities of China's national security, particularly concerning Xinjiang and the Uyghur issue. Another key difference lies in the importance of energy security, as access to Central Asia's abundant energy resources represents one of China's main strategic objectives. In contrast, in the Balkans—a more distant region under stronger influence from the EU, the United States, and NATO—China's engagement is more selective and predominantly economic, focusing on infrastructure projects and access to the wider European market. Political and security involvement is limited, being most intensive in Serbia. Although China also invests in energy projects in the Balkans, such activities are primarily linked to market access and the potential securing of resources for its broader needs, rather than to immediate energy security concerns, as in the case of Central Asia. Central Asia is key to China’s security and energy needs, whereas the Balkans function as a strategic gateway to EU markets and a space for enhancing political influence on Europe’s periphery.

These differences in strategic objectives and operational approaches point to the pragmatic and adaptive nature of China's foreign policy. Its actions are carefully tailored to the specific geopolitical context and characteristics of each region. In Central Asia, China acts as a co-superpower, shaping the regional order through economic, political, and security instruments, while in the Balkans, it is a secondary but rising actor seeking to expand its influence through infrastructure, loans, and political partnerships, balancing its global ambitions with the European institutional framework.

A LONG JOURNEY TO EUROPE: THE PERCEPTION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION DURING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PROJECT “JADAR” AND STUDENT PROTESTS IN SERBIA

Bojan Klačar — Thu, 11 Dec 2025 22:40:53 +0100

This paper researches the public perception of the European Union (EU) and the process of European integration in Serbia amid the context of large-scale student protests that began in November 2024 and the major tragedy in Novi Sad, as well as the ongoing lithium crisis associated with the controversial “Jadar” project. The aim of the study is to explore how the project “Jadar” and the student protests have affected the EU’s reputation and position within Serbian public opinion, to identify the social groups in which attitudes toward the EU are deteriorating, and to assess the potential long-term implications for the European integration process. The theoretical and methodological framework is grounded in literature emphasizing stability as a central point in the recent past of the EU’s approach to the Western Balkans – often at the expense of democratic principles – and incorporates data from a quantitative public opinion poll conducted on a nationally representative sample. Findings indicate that both the student protests and the lithium mining controversy have adversely influenced public attitudes toward the EU. Notably, this decline in support is observed even among pro-EU citizens, particularly in response to the EU’s official stance on the protests. Public opinion remains highly sceptical regarding the perceived (economic or developmental) benefits of the “Jadar” project, with environmental concerns and doubts over compliance with ecological standards prevailing. Moreover, a considerable portion of citizens critical of the EU’s role in the lithium mining process are individuals who already oppose Serbia’s EU accession. Regarding the student protests, the majority of the public expresses dissatisfaction with the EU's reactions – some perceiving them as too mild, while others regard them as excessively explicit and critical.

EUROPEAN UNION’S GREEN SOFT POWER IN CONTEMPORARY POLITICS: INSTRUMENTS, CONDITIONALITY AND GLOBAL LEADERSHIP

Ognjen Petronijević, Jelena Todorović Lazić — Fri, 12 Dec 2025 23:03:24 +0100

The article examines the concept of green soft power with a focus on the unique example of the European Union (EU). As one of the global leaders in combating climate change, the EU mobilizes its green soft power to shape the environmental changes internationally through non-coercive means. The article recognized environmental diplomacy, global climate leadership, sustainable culture, and green normative framework as key resources in projecting EU green soft power. Using regulatory authority, the EU complements its soft power with conditional mechanisms, making the Union adopt a hybrid form of soft power. The paper argues that the EU combines domestic ecological transformation, exemplified by the European Green Deal, with external instruments such as Chapter 27 of the enlargement process and the Global Gateway initiative, to project environmental norms globally. It further analyzes the EU strategy in recent international climate negotiations (COP26-COP28). Finally, the paper examines two important factors in international relations that limit the EU's capacity to perform and achieve environmental objectives in the international arena – the problematic withdrawal from the Paris Agreement by the United States, and complex evolving relations with China.

THE POLITICAL CONCEPT OF THE “MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION” IN THE WORKS OF JAMES BURNHAM

Dimitrije Milić — Fri, 12 Dec 2025 22:57:08 +0100

James Burnham, a 20th-century American conservative thinker, is best known for his concept of the “managerial revolution,” as presented in his 1941 work of the same name. Burnham identifies a new managerial elite, emerging from the owners’ need for experts capable of managing complex, international processes, as the successors of previous capitalist and socialist structures. In line with their growing social role, Burnham examines the influence of the managerial elite in both the public and private sectors, analyzing the consequences of this transformation for the democratic system. Although Burnham’s work did not find a place in the ideological mainstream, his thought has had a particular influence in contemporary conservative and populist circles. This paper aims to provide a critical reflection on the concept of managerialism and its impact on the transformation of social elites, power relations, and the nature of democracy.

IDENTITY CROSSROADS AND IDENTITY POLICIES IN MONTENEGRO ‒ IN THE FACE OF THE CENSUS RESULTS 2023-2024.

Vladan Stanković — Sat, 13 Dec 2025 00:27:45 +0100

The results of the population census conducted in Montenegro in December 2023 show several important indicators. First, a clear division into several national communities: Montenegrins, Serbs, Bosniaks, Albanians... Second, the Montenegrin people have retained the status of the majority people in Montenegro. This majority, however, is only relative (only 2 out of 5 residents of Montenegro belong to the Montenegrin nation). Montenegro is officially a multinational community, without a majority of people. Third, the Serbs have retained the position of the second largest national group in Montenegro. There are 4.2% more Serbs than in the previous census in 2011. Every third resident of Montenegro is a Serb by nationality. Fourth, the Bosniaks have increased their population at the expense of Muslims. They now make up 9.2% of the population. Now, a part of Bosniaks, who previously declared themselves as national Montenegrins, have returned to the Bosniak national corps. Fifth, the number of Albanians has remained within the expected limits (around 5%). The census results reveal the following identity intersections: Montenegrins in the majority want Montenegro as a civil community of national Montenegrins, to which all national-ethnic groups in the country should belong. Supporters of this idea see Montenegro in the regional environment of the European Union and NATO. On the other hand, the majority of the Serbian people in Montenegro see the future in closer integration of Montenegro with Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (Republika Srpska). The majority of Serbian political entities in Montenegro do not oppose membership in the European Union, but advocate non-aligned military neutrality, and see Montenegro outside the NATO pact. Finally, there is a third, middle option of residents who declare themselves Montenegrins, but who also preserve part of their Serbian identity: they speak the Serbian language, or at least attend the canonical church – the Serbian Orthodox Church. This population remains committed to the “democratic values” of EU and NATO membership, but wants to achieve closer relations with Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (Republika Srpska). The government of Milojko Spajić, his political movement (PES) in coalition with the Democrats of Montenegro, forms the backbone of this commitment. Montenegro is seen as a community of equal citizens but also of the peoples who live in it: Montenegrin, Serbian, Bosniak, and Albanian. The idea is that all ruling parties, with the opposition political movement URA of Dritan Abazović, build a reference political framework for control and changeability of power. This would avoid the danger of the return of former Montenegrin President Milo Đukanović’s DPS to power. The defense of democratic mechanisms and the defense of multinational stability remain the core values of these political processes.

“SECURITY SENSITIVE AREA” AS A REASON FOR RESTRICTING FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY

Danilo Stevandić — Fri, 12 Dec 2025 23:07:04 +0100

A security-sensitive area represents a defined area around buildings of the highest authorities, buildings of special importance for the security of the state, and certain institutions whose basic purpose is to provide undisturbed work of the state bodies by applying a specific regime of public assembly in the area. After the introductory exposure, the issue of assembly location has been processed from the jurisprudential point of view, after which a legal history and a comparative law analysis of protected areas as a way of restricting assembly were performed. In the fourth part, restrictions on assembly locations in the Republic of Serbia were analysed by applying the legal dogmatics method. The author concludes that applying a specific legal regime of assembly in a protected area has constitutional justification, but only if such a regime implies a relative ban on assembly, along with applying the proportionality principle. Under the constitutional law, a protected area cannot represent a justifiable reason for restricting freedom of assembly per se, but it has to be directly related to some of the international law or the constitutional law grounds for restricting freedom of assembly. Law on Public Assembly in the Republic of Serbia prescribes restrictions on assembly locations, including locations which, according to the comparative law experiences, may be considered a protected area, but the constitutionality of some of the restrictions may be questioned for valid reasons since they are defined in advance by the law, and they are also general and absolute.

LOCAL ELECTIONS IN ZAJEČAR AND KOSJERIĆ, 2025

Marko Mijatović — Thu, 11 Dec 2025 22:39:22 +0100

The regular local elections in the city of Zaječar and the municipality of Kosjerić, held on June 8, 2025, represented the first vote of Serbian citizens in the two local governments mentioned above, in the changed socio-political circumstances caused by the Novi Sad tragedy on November 1, 2024, in which sixteen people died after the collapse of a canopy at the Railway Station, and which culminated in student demonstrations that began at the end of the same month, first by students and professors of the Faculty of Dramatic Arts, and then by other faculties and universities in Serbia, which gained momentum in early 2025 and culminated with a protest in Belgrade in mid-March that gathered several hundred thousand people.

The involvement of students (or as we will call the student movement in the text) significantly changed the political landscape of Serbia – through, as public opinion polls have shown – a decline or even stagnation in the popularity of the ruling party, but also of opposition parties, with a sharp increase in the popularity of the student movement as a potential future political force. The first opportunity to demonstrate the new balance of political forces was the regular local elections in Zaječar and Kosjerić, scheduled for June 8, 2025. Although the opposition lists, with the support of the student movement, failed to win, their success turned out to be far more significant than in previous elections in these local governments.

Socialism and Discrimination: Piketty on Racism

Dušan Dostanić — Fri, 12 Dec 2025 23:01:15 +0100